

Route to: _____ _____ _____ _____
 _____ _____ _____ _____

Florida Family Law Practice Manual

Publication 80643 Release 78 April 2017

HIGHLIGHTS

Amended Family Law Forms:

- Certification of Military Service
- Name Change

Case Law:

- **Alimony** (in case of first impression, district court holds that income may be imputed based on nonliquid assets) [*Sherlock v. Sherlock*]
- **Timesharing** (for first time, Florida district court affirms order finding that parent's conduct regarding religious activity met all requirements necessary to allow trial court to restrict parent's behavior in connection with religious practice) [*Koch v. Koch*]
- **Marriage** (district court certifies question whether marriage entered into without court approval by person who has been adjudicated incapacitated, and whose right to contract has been removed, is void or voidable) [*Smith v. Smith*]
- **Child Support** (First District certifies conflict with Fourth District

as to whether income may be imputed to parent who is or is to be imprisoned for purposes of establishing initial child support obligation) [*Dep't of Revenue v. Llamas*]

- **Attorneys' Fees** (First District declares conflict with Fourth District concerning whether rejection of settlement offer may be sole basis for denying award of attorneys' fees to spouse whom trial court has determined has financial need for award of fees) [*Palmer v. Palmer*]

Amended Family Law Forms

Volume 4, Family Law Forms

Certification of Military Service

This release incorporates amended Florida Supreme Court Approved Form 12.912(a), *Memorandum for Certification of Military Service*. The amended form contains updated contact information for various military branches to which the form must be sent. This release also incorporates amended instructions for Form 12.912(a). The instructions, as amended, (1) inform litigants that the contact information in Form 12.912(a) is current as of the form's

effective date, but is subject to change; and (2) add a website address and telephone number for a litigant to use if he or she has difficulty obtaining a certification of military service or needs additional information.

Name Change

This release incorporates amended standard forms of petition for change of name. The affected forms are Florida Supreme Court Approved Forms 12.982(a), *Petition for Change of Name (Adult)*, 12.982(c), *Petition for Change of Name (Minor Child(ren))*, and 12.982(f), *Petition for Change of Name (Family)*. The Florida Supreme Court adopted amendments to the forms to reflect a 2014 legislative amendment that requires a petition for name change to show whether the petitioner has ever been required to register as a sexual predator under Florida Statutes Section 775.21, or as a sexual offender under Florida Statutes Section 943.0435 [see Fla. Stat. § 68.07(3)(i)].

Case Law

Chapter 1, *Marriage*

This release incorporates a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in which the court certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court as to whether a marriage is void or voidable if it is entered into without prior court approval by a ward who has been adjudicated incompetent and whose right to contract has been removed. By statute, a ward whose right to contract has been removed may not marry without prior court approval [see Fla. Stat. § 744.3215(2)(a)]. The Fourth District majority focused on the ward's constitutional right to marry, writing that the statutory removal of a ward's right to contract and accompanying removal of right to marry restricts the ward's constitutional, fundamental right to marry [see *Loving v. Virginia*, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1817, 18 L. Ed.

2d 1010 (1967)]. Therefore, according to the majority, the question whether the statute renders a marriage void or merely voidable if it is entered into by an incapacitated person without prior court approval is a question of great public importance that the Florida Supreme Court should address [see *Smith v. Smith*, 195 So. 3d 416, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)]. Judge Damoorgian dissented, arguing that the State has a compelling interest in protecting a ward whose right to contract has been removed from nefarious conduct, and requiring court approval of a marriage by the ward is not an undue burden on the ward's fundamental right to marry [see *Smith v. Smith*, 195 So. 3d 416, 416 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Damoorgian, J., dissenting)].

Chapter 7, *Discovery*

In this release, the discussion about examinations of persons has been supplemented with coverage of a case in which the district court reviewed the requirements for ordering mental health examinations, and held that the trial court erred in ordering a wife to submit to a psychological evaluation because she homeschooled the parties' children. The lower court's order departed from the essential requirements of law in that it did not (1) include a finding that the wife's mental health was in controversy; (2) address the good-cause requirement for ordering a psychological evaluation; and (3) identify the length, type, or methods of evaluation. Expanding on the third element, the district court explained that the failure of an order for psychological evaluation to specify the manner, conditions, and scope of the evaluation effectively gives the psychologist *carte blanche* to perform any type of psychological inquiry, testing, and analysis, and constitutes an impermissible, open-ended order that requires reversal [see *Manubens v. Man-*

ubens, 198 So. 3d 1072, 1075 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)].

Also in this release, a discussion about claims of privilege has been added to the coverage of requests for production in Chapter 7. The discoverability of otherwise-privileged material is addressed, including reliance on privileged material to prove a claim or defense as a ground to discover privileged material, and waiver of privilege as a defense to production. Additionally, this release covers a United States District Court of Appeal opinion in which the Court found lack of attorney-client privilege in email communications between an employee and his attorneys that the employee had sent to from his personal email account to his work email account on his employer's communications system so he could access the emails at work. The U.S. District Court held that the plaintiff had not met his burden of showing that he reasonably expected his communications to be confidential, because his employer had express policies restricting personal use of its communication systems, had warned employees they had no expectations of privacy in emails transmitted over those systems, and the employee knew about the employer's policies. Therefore, the Court granted the defendant's motion for determination that the emails between the plaintiff and his attorneys were not privileged [*see* Bingham v. BayCare Health Sys., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94590, ___ Fed. L. Weekly ___, ___ F. Supp. ___ (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2016)].

Chapter 8, Parental Responsibility and Timesharing

This release contains coverage of the first Florida case in which a district court affirmed a trial court order finding that a parent's conduct regarding religious activity met all the requirements necessary to

allow the trial court to restrict the parent's behavior in connection with religious practice. In that case, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed a parenting plan under which a father was prohibited from discussing any religious matters with the parties' children during his timesharing with them. The district court held the timesharing restriction was proper because the record clearly and affirmatively showed that the father's admonishments, threats of damnation, and demonization of the children's mother had caused each of the children anxiety and emotional distress severe enough to qualify as abuse. The district court differentiated between unconstitutional, improper restrictions on a parent's religious beliefs and permissible restrictions on a parent's religious activities that are harmful to his or her child [*see* Koch v. Koch, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14510, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2197, ___ So. 3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 28, 2016)].

In another case involving timesharing restrictions that is covered in this release, the Fifth District held that a trial court erred in denying a mother's request for an order restricting exposure of the parties' child to dogs while he was visiting the father. The mother's request should have been granted, the Fifth District held, because the evidence at trial showed that the child was allergic to dogs and the testimony of more than one physician established that the child should avoid exposure to dogs as much as possible [*see* Palmer v. Palmer, 199 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)].

A Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) case involving a petition for determination of paternity, parental responsibility, and child support brought by a putative father in Florida is included in this release, Florida was the child's home state because the child was born in Florida and lived there

for 11 days with the mother and putative father until the mother relocated with the child to New York State. The fact that paternity had not been adjudicated at the time UCCJEA proceedings were commenced did not prevent jurisdiction from arising in Florida. Similarly, the fact that the child was born out of wedlock did not affect the status of home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA [*Baker v. Tunney*, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1238 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)].

Chapter 9, Child Support

This release covers a newly emerged conflict between the First and Fourth District Courts of Appeal as to whether income may be imputed to a parent in prison or bound for prison shortly after a child support hearing, for purposes of establishing an initial child support obligation. The First District has ruled that income may not be imputed in such circumstances, and has certified conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal regarding the issue [*see Dep't of Revenue v. Llamas*, 196 So. 3d 1267, 1270–1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (certifying conflict with *McCall v. Martin* [34 So. 3d 121 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)]]).

Note: The release expands discussion of imputing income to incarcerated parents in both initial and modification proceedings.

In another child support case addressed in this release, the Third District Court of Appeal expanded the rule that child support payments may not be subordinated to attorneys' fees, by ruling that child support payments also may not be subordinated to fees charged by guardians ad litem. In other words, child support obligors may not be ordered to pay litigation fees charged by (attorneys or) guardians ad litem from funds that the obligors would otherwise include in their child support payments, because such orders impermissibly reduce the amount of child support paid actually

by the obligors [*see Adkins v. Sotolongo*, 197 So. 3d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016)].

Chapter 10, Alimony

The following principles and the recent district court opinions establishing or discussing them are incorporated into Chapter 10 in this release:

(1) Income may be imputed not only with respect to liquid assets owned by a spouse requesting alimony, but also with respect to nonliquid assets [*Sherlock v. Sherlock*, 199 So. 3d 1039, 1044 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (case of first impression)].

Note: Discussion regarding imputation of income based on liquid and nonliquid assets has been added to Chapter 10 in this release.

(2) Lump-sum alimony may serve a support function connected to equitable distribution by providing postjudgment support pending distribution of assets received in equitable distribution [*see Dunkel v. Dunkel*, 196 So. 3d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (in case in which parties had agreed wife would not receive permanent alimony, district court expressed sympathy with trial court's concern about wife's ability to support herself until equitable distribution was at least partially effectuated, but explained that continuation of temporary alimony was not proper method to address that concern and remanded for consideration of lump-sum alimony, thereby implying proper support function for lump-sum alimony in such circumstances)].

(3) An award of durational alimony instead of permanent alimony is inappropriate for the spouse of a moderate-term marriage if he or she proves that he or she lacks the actual capacity for self-support and the potential to develop that capacity. For example, if the spouse proves that he or

she is physically disabled and unable to work due to health conditions that developed during the parties' marriage, an award of durational alimony is erroneous, just as an award of rehabilitative alimony—another type of alimony that terminates within a limited time—would be erroneous [*see* *Kruse v. Levesque*, 192 So. 3d 1263, 1267 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (citing *G'Sell v. G'Sell* [390 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (reversing award of rehabilitative alimony and remanding for award of permanent periodic alimony because obligee-wife did not have actual or potential capacity for self-support))].

(4) An award of nominal alimony is inappropriate if the obligor-spouse possesses the ability to pay more alimony by applying diligent effort. In such a case, the trial court should impute income to the obligor [*Koscher v. Koscher*, 201 So. 3d 736, 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)].

Chapter 10B, *Equitable Distribution of Marital Assets*

This release contains discussion of a case in which the Fourth District addresses the subject of unequal distribution that is ordered based on dissipation of marital assets, and clearly states that such unequal distribution must be “proportional” to the dissipation. The Fourth District declined to define what is “proportional” to dissipation of marital assets as a general matter [*see* *Pachter v. Pachter*, 194 So. 3d 567, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)]. However, in the case before it, the court held that the trial court's unequal distribution was disproportionate to the dissipation perpetrated by the husband in making fraudulent withdrawals from the wife's Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and spending the funds on nonmarital purposes. The court affirmed the trial court's award to the wife of the entire remaining portion of her IRA—an

amount that covered the funds wrongfully taken and an additional amount. The district court also affirmed the trial court's award to the wife of exclusive occupancy of the marital home pending its sale, and its order to the husband to pay all carrying costs of the home until its sale. The district court affirmed that order on the ground the husband's fraudulent behavior had deprived the wife of IRA funds that she could have used to pay expenses on the marital home. However, the Fourth District held that the lower court had erred in failing to order reimbursement of the husband for half of the carrying costs paid by him from the proceeds of sale of the home. According to the Fourth District, because of the unequal distribution of the IRA, the order awarding the wife exclusive occupancy and requiring the husband to pay all marital home expenses pending its sale, “there was nothing further that the trial court needed to counterbalance” after the marital home was sold. Therefore, failing to order a credit to the husband for one-half of the home's expenses from its sale proceeds rendered the total sanctions imposed on the husband disproportionate to the dissipation perpetrated by him, and therefore excessive [*see* *Pachter v. Pachter*, 194 So. 3d 567, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)].

Chapter 11, *Marital Settlement Agreements Negotiated by the Parties*

Chapter 11 has been updated in this release with an opinion holding that an oral marital settlement agreement whose terms have been read into the record in open court is only enforceable if each party has clearly assented to the terms of the agreement under oath and on the record. Additionally, the trial judge must inquire of each party whether he or she has discussed the agreement with his or her attorney and fully understands the agreement [*Richardson v.*

Knight, 197 So. 3d 143, 145 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)].

Chapter 14, Enforcement

This release incorporates a First District opinion in which the court—based on inadequacy of the record evidence—reversed a trial court’s order adopting a hearing officer’s recommendation of contempt and incarceration of a father for failure to pay child support. In the opinion, the First District discusses in detail how the evidence presented (1) was inadequate to establish that the respondent had a present ability to pay support and willfully failed to do so, and was therefore inadequate to support the trial court’s finding of contempt; and (2) failed to support a finding of present ability of the father to purge the contempt and obtain his release from incarceration. Regarding failure of the evidence to support the finding of contempt, the First District described clearly inadequate evidence pertaining to alleged employment income and funds available from alleged assets, and acknowledged but rejected record evidence showing the contemnor-father received substantial, intermittent annuity payments that allegedly would have covered the support. Regarding failure of the evidence to support a finding of present ability of the father to purge the contempt and obtain his release from incarceration, the district court stated that to the extent the trial judge believed the contemnor-father’s family would pay for his release, this belief was legally insufficient to establish a present ability of the father to pay. Evidence had been shown that a prior purge amount had been paid by a relative, and the First District indicated that this evidence was not adequate to support a finding of present ability of the father to purge his contempt and obtain release from incarceration [*see Nation v. Boling*, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 18092, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D2725, ___ So.

3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA Dec. 8, 2016)].

Note: Additional citations to the governing family law rule, Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.615, have been added to the text discussion about contempt in Chapter 14.

Chapter 15, Modification

A modification case covered in this release is *Loza v. Marin* [198 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)], in which the Second District reviewed the law governing a trial court’s jurisdiction to extend child support for a child who will remain dependent past the age of 18 based on a physical or mental incapacity. The crucial issue, the Second District court concluded, is whether the child’s continuing dependence after majority has been effectively adjudicated before the child reaches the age of majority. An effective adjudication may be found in an agreement between the parties that is entered-into prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday, or in the trial court’s final judgment that is entered prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday [*see Loza v. Marin*, 198 So. 3d 1017, 1022 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (there was no effective adjudication of son’s continuing incapacity in any child support order or in parties’ marital settlement agreement)].

Another modification case included in this release pertains to the criteria for a statutory supportive relationship that will allow modification of alimony. Specifically, the release covers a Fifth District case in which the court held that wedding photographs and social media postings showed the obligee and her cohabitant had held themselves out to be a married couple and were in a loving, romantic relationship. The district court also held that evidence the wife lived with her cohabitant, paid him rent, performed odd jobs around the house, and evidence that her son and his girlfriend

lived in the cohabitant's for one year, and finally, evidence that the wife's cohabitant owned the house and paid the utility bills, showed that the wife and her cohabitant supported each other financially [*see Martin v. Robbins*, 194 So. 3d 563, 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)].

Chapter 17, Attorney's Fees

The following are brief descriptions of district court opinions that are incorporated into Chapter 17 in this release:

- (1) The First District Court of Appeal has ruled that factors mentioned in *Rosen* relate only "to the overall method" by which the litigation was handled by the party requesting fees, and *Rosen* does not contemplate denials of fees based on isolated considerations of settlement offers. Consequently, the First District declared conflict with the Fourth District to the extent that the Fourth District determined rejection of a settlement offer may be the sole basis for denying an award of attorneys' fees to a spouse the trial court has determined has a financial need for the award of fees [*see Palmer v. Palmer*, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12056, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1824, ___ So. 3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA Aug. 9, 2016) (certifying conflict with *Hallac v. Hallac* [88 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)])].
- (2) In the Fourth District, if a party requesting fees as a sanction under Section 57.105 fails to comply with the safe-harbor notice requirements of the statute, the trial court may still impose fees on its own initiative, so long as the trial court is not simply adopting the moving party's motion [*see Wat-*

son v. Stewart Tilghman Fox & Bianchi, P.A., 195 So. 3d 1163, 1170 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)]. In contrast, in the Fifth District, the trial court may impose fees based on all or part of the grounds stated in the moving party's motion for fees [*see HFC Collection Center, Inc. v. Alexander*, 190 So. 3d 1114 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016)].

- (3) The First District Court of Appeal has ruled that attorneys' fees may be awarded as a sanction pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 57.105 in an action for an injunction against repeat violence. Although the statute governing injunctions against repeat violence does not authorize awards of attorneys' fees, the First District acknowledged, the statute also does not prohibit awards under Section 57.105. Further, Section 57.105 broadly provides that it applies to civil proceedings and is supplemental to other remedies. The First District certified conflict with the Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal on the issue of whether Section 57.105 fees may be awarded in proceedings for injunctions against repeat violence [*Hall v. Lopez*, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 11493, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1763, ___ So. 3d ___ (Fla. 1st DCA July 28, 2016) (citing conflict with *Dudley v. Schmidt* [963 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)]; *Ratigan v. Stone* [947 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)]; *Cisneros v. Cisneros* [831 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)])].
- (4) In a Fifth District dissolution of marriage case, the appeals court adhered to the longstanding, still-

viable Florida rule requiring an independent expert witness to testify regarding the reasonableness of claimed attorneys' fees. In the case before the Fifth District, a plaintiff-attorney and his staff had given sworn testimony about the amount of time each expended on the dissolution matter and the respective rates of compensation charged by each, but no expert testimony had been given. The district court held that expert witness testimony was also required under Florida law to address the reasonableness of the fees amount sought [*see Ghannam v. Shelnut*, 199 So. 3d 295 (Fla. 5th DCA June 1, 2016)].

cussion than its predecessor concerning the proper method to raise certain defenses, including specific defenses that may be raised by motion prior to filing an answer and affirmative defenses that must be specifically pled in an answer. Also, waiver of a defense through failure to plead, and implied consent to trial of an otherwise-waived defense, are covered. Allegations by a respondent regarding specific subjects such as the validity of the parties' marriage, parental responsibility and timesharing, and attorneys' fees, are also discussed. Discussion of the time for filing an answer is added. Finally, outdated forms in Chapter 6 have been eliminated.

Revised Chapter

Chapter 6, *The Answer*

Chapter 6, formerly named "The Response," is renamed "The Answer" in this release and is revised in its entirety to expand discussion of the function of an answer. New discussion differentiates answers from counterpetitions and discusses the contents of both. In addition, the revised chapter contains more detailed dis-

Matthew Bender provides continuing customer support for all its products:

- **Editorial assistance**—please consult the "Questions About This Publication" directory printed on the copyright page;
- **Customer Service**—missing pages, shipments, billing or other customer service matters (1-800-833-9844).
- **Outside the United States and Canada**, (518) 487-3000, or fax (518) 487-3584;
- **Toll-free ordering** (1-800-223-1940).



www.lexis.com

Copyright © 2017 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
Publication 80643, Release 78, April 2017

LexisNexis, the knowledge burst logo, and Michie are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties Inc.

Florida Family Law Practice Manual

Publication 80643 Release 78

April 2017

**Check
As
Done**

- 1. Check the Title page in the front of your present Volume 1. It should indicate that your set is filed through Release Number 77. If the set is current, proceed with the filing of this release. If your set is not filed through Release Number 77, DO NOT file this release. Please call Customer Services at 1-800-833-9844 for assistance in bringing your set up to date.
- 2. Separate this Release Number 78 package into the following groups of material:
 - White Tab Card
 - White Revision pages
- Arrange these groups of material next to each other so that you can take material from each group as required and proceed with the filing of this release.
- 3. Circulate the "Publication Update" among those individuals interested in the contents of this release.

**Check
As
Done** Remove Old
Pages Numbered

Insert New
Pages Numbered

For faster and easier filing, all references are to right-hand pages only.

VOLUME 1

Revision

- | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 1 thru vii | 1 thru ix |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 1-3. | 1-3 thru 1-4.1 |

Tab Card

- | | | |
|--------------------------|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Remove Chapter 6 “The Responses” Tab
Card | Insert Chapter 6 “The Answer” Tab Card |
|--------------------------|--|--|

Revision

- | | | |
|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 6-1 thru 6-7. | 6-1 thru 6-11 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 7-15 thru 7-36.3. | 7-15 thru 7-36.5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 8-29 thru 8-30.1. | 8-29 thru 8-30.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 8-47 | 8-47 thru 8-48.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 8-87 thru 8-90.1. | 8-87 thru 8-90.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 8-116.1 thru 8-118.1. | 8-117 thru 8-118.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 9-1. | 9-1 thru 9-2.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 9-11 thru 9-25 | 9-11 thru 9-26.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 9-36.1 thru 9-39. | 9-37 thru 9-40.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10-9 | 10-9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10-20.1 thru 10-22.3. | 10-21 thru 10-22.5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10-39. | 10-39 thru 10-40.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10-59 thru 10-65 | 10-59 thru 10-66.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10-76.1. | 10-76.1 thru 10-76.2(1) |

VOLUME 2

Revision

- | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Title page. | Title page |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 10B-19 thru 10B-22.1 | 10B-19 thru 10B-22.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 11-13. | 11-13 thru 11-14.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 14-44.1 thru 14-48.1. | 14-45 thru 14-48.11 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 14-69. | 14-69 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 15-37. | 15-37 thru 15-38.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 15-48.1 thru 15-48.9. | 15-48.1 thru 15-48.9 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 17-1 | 17-1 thru 17-2.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 17-11. | 17-11 thru 17-12.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 17-21 thru 17-26.3 | 17-21 thru 17-26.5 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 17-55 thru 17-61 | 17-55 thru 17-61 |

VOLUME 3

Check As Done	<i>Remove Old Pages Numbered</i>	<i>Insert New Pages Numbered</i>
------------------------------	--------------------------------------	--------------------------------------

Revision

- | | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Title page. | Title page |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | TC-1 thru TC-83 | TC-1 thru TC-85 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | TS-1 thru TS-23 | TS-1 thru TS-27 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | I-1 thru I-27 | I-1 thru I-27 |

VOLUME 4

Revision

- | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> | Title page. | Title page |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 259 thru 261 | 259 thru 262.1 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | 547 thru 570.15. | 547 thru 570.16(7) |

FILE IN THE FRONT OF THE FIRST VOLUME
OF YOUR SET

To order missing pages log on to our self service center, www.lexisnexis.com/printcdsc or call Customer Services at 1 (800) 833-9844 and have the following information ready:

- (1) the publication title;
- (2) specific volume, chapter and page numbers; and
- (3) your name, phone number, and Matthew Bender account number.

Please recycle removed pages.

MISSING FILING INSTRUCTIONS?
FIND THEM AT www.lexisnexis.com/printcdsc

Use the search tool provided to find and download missing filing instructions, or sign on to the Print & CD Service Center to order missing pages or replacement materials. Visit us soon to see what else the Print & CD Service Center can do for you!



www.lexis.com

Copyright © 2017 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group.
Publication 80643, Release 78, April 2017

LexisNexis, the knowledge burst logo, and Michie are trademarks of Reed Elsevier Properties Inc., used under license. Matthew Bender is a registered trademark of Matthew Bender Properties Inc.